predictions from populations of objects to randomly drawn samples, whereas 20 monkeys seem not to be. Statistical reasoning can also be investigated in tasks in 21 which the probabilities of different possibilities must be inferred from relative 22 frequencies of events, but little is known about the performance of nonhuman 23 primates in such tasks. In the current study, we investigated whether long-tailed 24 macaques extract statistical information from repeated types of events to make 25 predictions under uncertainty. In each experiment, monkeys first experienced the 26 probability of rewards associated with different factors separately. In a subsequent 27 test trial, monkeys could then choose between the different factors presented 28 simultaneously. In Experiment 1, we tested whether long-tailed macaques relied on 29 probabilities and not on a comparison of absolute quantities to make predictions. In 30 Experiment 2 and 3 we varied the nature of the predictive factors and the complexity 31
Introduction 39
Most individuals live in an uncertain world, characterized by statistical regularities. A 40 key challenge for individuals is to extract these regularities in order to make 41 predictions under uncertainty and adjust their decisions accordingly. Such regularities 42 encompass the non-social as well as the social domain. For instance, during certain 43 times of the year, specific trees are more likely to bear fruits than during other times, 44
while some group members may be more willing to cooperate than others. In 45 addition, different factors may covary conditionally. Your friend may be more willing 46 to lend you money at the beginning of the month than at the end of it, when her 47 budget is low. Trees are more likely to bear fruits not only during the summer, but 48 also when there was sufficient sunshine and rain. 49
Inferential statistics entails the use of relative frequencies of events, and their 50 covariation patterns with different factors or variables, to derive generalizations about 51 the predictive power of these factors and variables, and to make predictions about 52 future events. This requires the ability to represent factors and variables and to form 53 hypotheses about their relationships with the observed outcomes (Tenenbaum, 54 Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman, 2011). Importantly, statistical inferences rely on 55 calculations describing probabilistic relationships between populations and samples 56 randomly obtained from these populations. This allows to differentiate between 57 patterns of outcomes that are probably the result of chance, and patterns that are 58 probably not and that can therefore be attributed with different confidence levels to 59 hypothesised factors or variables. Inferential statistics allows to strengthen, revise or 60 discard these hypotheses, which in turn increases knowledge about the structure of 61 one's environment and improves the precision of predictions (Jaynes, 2003) . 62
In the past decades, an increasing body of research has been occupied with 63 exploring the origins of statistical reasoning, and in particular, of intuitions about the 64 Several studies showed that human infants have such intuitions, and use them to 66 make predictions under uncertainty and adjust their decisions accordingly. For 67 example, when observing different types of objects moving in a container, 12-month-68 olds expect objects of the majority type to randomly exit the container, or objects 69 closer to the exit (Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, 2007; Téglás et al., 2011; 70 Téglás, Ibanez-Lillo, Costa & Bonatti, 2015) . Similarly, 8-and 12-month-olds use 71 information such as the relative frequencies of static objects present in a container 72 (Xu & Garcia 2008) , as well as information about sampling conditions (random or 73 biased) (Xu & Denison, 2009) , to predict which type of object is going to be sampled 74 from the recipient, and to adjust their decisions accordingly . 75
Infants also seem to use probabilistic intuitions to make predictions and 76 generalizations from samples to populations. For example, 6-and 8-month-olds 77 integrate prior knowledge about the possible distribution of objects in different 78 populations, and evidence produced by samples obtained from a hidden population, 79
to predict the content of that population (Xu & Garcia, 2008 , Denison, Trikatum & Xu, 80 2014 . Note, however, that controls to rule out the possibility that children relied on 81 quantity heuristics rather than probabilities were not conducted in these studies. 82
Fifteen-month-olds rely on cues of random or biased sampling (based on the 83 probability of obtaining the observed sample given a random or a biased sampling, or 84 based on the behaviour of the agent performing the sampling), in order to flexibly 85 generalize the property of the sampled objects to only part of the population, or to the 86 entire population (Gweon, Tenenbaum & Schulz, 2010) . Taken together, these 87 findings suggest that some intuitive form of statistical reasoning evolved 88 independently from human culture as a powerful induction mechanism allowing 89 humans, from very early on, to infer meaning from the probabilistic contingencies 90 structuring their physical and social world. 91
Eckert, Rakoczy & Fischer, 2018, respectively) were tested for their ability to predict 96 the outcomes of sampling events out of populations of objects, based on a paradigm 97 previously developed for human infants . While results from the 98 ape studies indicate that they, similar to human infants, possess this ability, results 99 from the monkey studies were more ambiguous. The capuchin monkeys did not 100 perform well in a control condition necessary to rule out the use of a quantity heuristic 101 in their reasoning process, and among the group of long-tailed macaques, only one 102 individual performed well in most experiments, whereas the rest of the group seemed 103 to rely on quantity heuristics. Similar to human infants, apes consider sampling 104 conditions (random or biased) when making inferences from populations to samples 105 (Eckert et al., 2018a) . Apes were also compared to human infants in their ability to 106 reason from samples to populations of objects (Eckert, Rakoczy & Call, 2017) . The 107 results of this study indicate that the apes based their choices on the absolute 108 number of objects present in samples, rather than on the probability that a given 109 population produced a given sample. These findings suggest that apes possess 110 similar statistical reasoning abilities to human children, but that monkeys might rely 111 on quantity heuristics to make predictions. 112
However, the ability to rely on statistical information to make predictions 113 under uncertainty need not necessarily be investigated with paradigms akin to games 114 of chance, in which objects are randomly sampled out of a container. Different 115 studies investigated children's ability to extract statistical information from repeated 116 types of events to estimate the likelihood with which different factors produce 117 different frequencies of outcomes. Findings suggest that human children are also 118 Apes and capuchin monkeys were also tested in paradigms in which they had 137 to make predictions based on statistical information sampled from repeated events 138 (Völter et al. 2016 , Edwards et al., 2014 . Findings suggest that they relied on the 139 relative frequencies at which two different objects activated a mechanical device 140 together or separately, to predict which object was more likely to activate a device on 141 its own. However, all these studies did not systematically test whether subjects relied 142 on statistical information rather than on quantity heuristics. 143
In summary, these findings suggest that some aspects of statistical reasoning 144 are evolutionary ancient. While apes share some (but not all) of the abilities of human 145 monkeys would be able to process statistical information extracted from repeated 147 types of events rather than on quantity heuristics, in order to make predictions under 148 uncertainty. In other words, the presentation format may matter in the application of 149 intuitive statistical abilities. The current study aimed to shed more light on this 150 question. More specifically, we aimed to investigate whether a group of long-tailed 151 macaques (Macaca fascicularis), that previously failed in making predictions from 152 populations of objects to samples (see Placì et al. 2018) , would be able to extract 153 statistical information from a succession of repeated actions, to make predictions 154 about new events and adjust their decisions accordingly. We also aimed to 155 investigate the boundaries of such ability, by varying the nature and the number of 156 factors potentially producing the outcomes. 157
The study contained three main experiments. In Experiment 1, monkeys had 158 the choice between two objects that were associated with different probabilities to 159 yield a reward. In a sampling phase, monkeys experienced the statistical patterns of 160 rewards associated with both objects separately. In the subsequent test, monkeys 161 could then choose between the two objects presented simultaneously. Different 162 conditions were used to rule out that monkeys relied on quantity heuristics. In 163 Experiment 2, monkeys were presented with two humans operating one box 164 containing grapes. The two persons differed in their propensity to open the box and 165 reward the monkeys with a grape. Again, monkeys experienced the rewarding 166 patterns associated with both humans separately in the sampling phase, before 167 having to make a choice between both humans in the test trial. In Experiment 3, 168 monkeys were presented with two humans operating two boxes. The rewarding 169 pattern were conditional either on the boxes or on the humans depending on the 170 condition. In a first condition, the rewarding patterns covaried with the two boxes in 171 the sampling phase (both humans were better at opening one box than the other), 172
Experiment 1 176
The aim of this experiment was twofold. We first aimed to assess whether long-tailed 177 macaques extract numerical information from repeated types of events at all, in order 178 to make rational decisions. Second, we aimed to assess whether their decisions are 179 based on probabilities (comparing relative frequencies) or on quantity heuristics 180 (comparing absolute frequencies). Experiment 1 consisted of four test conditions 181 (Exp.1a-d) divided in twelve sessions, in which long-tailed macaques could first learn 182 rewarding frequencies associated with two objects, and then choose between both 183 objects presented simultaneously. Exp. 1a-c differed in respect to the rewarding 184 frequencies associated with both objects (see Table 1 ). Exp. 1a tested monkeys' 185 ability to select the best option in an easy scenario, in which the favourable object 186 was probabilistically and absolutely associated to more rewards (favourable object: 187 10 out of 10 rewards; unfavourable object: 4 out of 10 rewards, see Table 1 ). 188
Success in such a scenario could be based on comparing probabilities, on comparing 189 only absolute frequencies, or on comparing certain to uncertain patterns. Exp. 1b 190 aimed to rule out this latter strategy, by associating both objects with uncertain 191 rewarding frequencies (favourable object: 8 out of 10 rewards; unfavourable object: 4 192 out of 10 rewards). Success in such a scenario could still be based on a comparison 193 of absolute frequencies. Exp. 1c aimed to rule out this strategy, by associating both 194 object with the same absolute number of rewards, but with different probabilities 195 (favourable object: 4 out of 4 rewards; unfavourable object: 4 out of 10 rewards). In 196
Exp. 1a-c, the side on which both objects were presented was kept constant during 197 all twelve session. Exp. 1d was similar to Exp. 1c in terms of the rewarding patterns 198 associated with both options, but not in terms of the side on which they were 199 presented, which was counterbalanced between sessions. The aim of this conditions 200 was to control whether long-tailed macaques really chose between the two objects 201 rather than between the two sides. 202 13 monkeys -aged 1 to 8 years -took part in Exp. 1a but only 12 (female N = 5) 208 completed it (see Table S1 of the supplementary material for details). and had access to indoor (49 m²) and outdoor areas (173 m²), which were equipped 214 with branches, trunks, ropes and other enriching objects. All individuals were already 215 experienced in participating in cognitive experiments and some of them previously 216 took part in experiments requiring them to indicate a choice between two objects via 217 pointing or reaching towards it. All testing was non-invasive, and subjects 218 participated voluntarily. They were not food deprived for testing, and water was 219 always available ad libitum. The monkeys were fed regular monkey chow, fruits and 220 vegetables twice a day. 221
Ethics 222
All experiments were performed under the control of experienced veterinarians to 223 ensure that the studies were in accordance with the NRC Guide for the Care Study procedure 262 sampling phase, and a test trial (see Fig. 2 ). In all conditions, the options presented 264 to subjects were different coloured climbing carabiners. Each of the 12 sessions 265 unfolded as follow: the experimenter would approach the first carabiner towards one 266 of the two holes in the Plexiglas, wait for the monkey to touch it, and then reward the 267 monkey with a grape or not, from a bowl standing in the middle of the table (see 268 Figure 1 ). This procedure was repeated four or ten times depending on the option 269 and the condition (see Table 1 ), with 20 seconds intervals between the moment the 270 monkey touched the carabiner and the next presentation. The same procedure was 271 repeated for the second carabiner (sampling phase). After the last presentation, the 272 experimenter would wait 30 seconds and then present both carabiners 273 simultaneously (test trial). Rewarding frequencies associated with both objects in the 274 test trial were meant to reflect those in the sampling phase, but as there was only 275 one trial per session, they were spread across the twelve test trials of the twelve 276 sessions. All non-rewarded events were pseudo randomly distributed among all 277 presentations. All subjects started with Exp. 1a, half of them went on with Exp. 1b 278 and then Exp. 1c, and half with Exp. 1c and then Exp.1b. All subjects completed Exp. 279 1d last. In all experiments, all sessions were separated by either half a day or more. 280
In each condition, the option presented first was counterbalanced across trials, and 281 the colour of option A was counterbalanced between subjects. Different combinations 282 of coloured carabiners were used in the different conditions. 283
Coding and analysis 284
Every session was video recorded. The experimenter coded monkeys' choices live. 285
Whenever monkeys chose the favourable option, we scored it as a success, while we 286 scored it as a failure when they chose the unfavourable option. A second observer 287 coded 25% of the sessions of the first three conditions, using the video recordings. 288
Agreement between the experimenter and the second coder was perfect for all 289 experiments (100% of agreement). To test whether monkeys' mean group 290 performance for each experiment was different from chance, we computed one 291 sample one-tailed t-tests. In addition, to check whether monkeys' performance 292 changed over the course of sessions, we computed the correlation coefficient 293 between group performance and trial number separately for all conditions. All 294 analyses were performed using R (R core Team 2017). 
Results and discussion 301
On average, on a total of 12 test trials, subjects selected the favourable option in 302 10.7 trials in Exp. 1a (88.9%; SD = 0.78 trials), 9.6 trials in Exp. 1b (80%; SD = 1.58 303 individual performances, see Table S1 for the supplementary material). In addition, in 308 all conditions, there was a significant correlation between group performance and 309 trial number (Exp. 1a: r = 0.77, p < 0.01; Exp. 1b: r = 0.86, p < .001; Exp. 1c: r = 0.97, 310 p < .0001; Exp. 1d: r = 0.7, p = .01, see Fig. 4 ). Long-tailed macaques reached 311 ceiling in the last trials of all conditions except in Exp. 1d. These results suggest that 312 long-tailed macaques as a group extracted statistical information provided in the 313 sampling phase, to estimate the probability with which interacting with each object 314 would yield a reward, and adjusted their decisions accordingly in the test trials. 315
Monkeys good performance in Exp. 1d further indicates that they considered the 316 objects to be predictive of rewards, and not only the side on which they were 317
presented. Interestingly, even if monkeys performed above chance in all conditions, 318 the rewarding patterns associated to both options -and therefore the condition -319 seemed to have an effect on their performance. We ran a post-hoc Generalized 320
Linear Mixed Model (GLMM; Baayen, 2008) , with monkeys' choices in Exp. 1a, 1b 321 and 1c as dependant variable, condition, trial number and the order in which each 322 individual underwent the different conditions as fixed factors, and individual ID as 323 random factor, to further test if the condition had an effect on monkeys' performance, 324 and to assess whether there were differences between conditions. The GLMM 325 revealed that condition had a main effect on subject's performance (X 2 = 14.457, df = 326 2, p = 0.001; see Table S2 of supplementary materials for more details), as well as 327 the trial number. A post-hoc investigation showed that monkeys performed 328 significantly better in Exp. 1a (favourable object: 10/10 rewards; unfavourable object: 329 4/10 rewards) compared to Exp. 1c (favourable object: 4/4 rewards; unfavourable 330 object: 4/10 rewards; estimate ± CI = -2.31 ± 0.69, p < .01, see supplementary 331 materials for more details), and in Exp. 1b (favourable object: 8/10 rewards; 332 unfavourable object: 4/10 rewards) compared to Exp. 1c (estimate ± CI = 0.98 ± 333 0.37, p = .02). These results suggest that long-tailed macaques considered both the 334 relative frequency of rewards associated with both objects, and the number of 335 presentations of each object (and therefore the sample size) in the sampling phase, 336
to make predictions and direct their choices in the test trial. The fact that their 337 performance in choosing the favourable option improved across sessions in every 338 condition further suggests that the confidence of their predictions increased with an 339 increased sample size, as with each new session, they underwent a new sampling 340
phase. An alternative explanation could, however, also account for these results, 341
namely that long-tailed macaques relied on a strategy of avoidance of the object that 342 was associated with the most non-rewarding events. Yet, if this was the case, they 343
should have performed at similar levels in Exp. 1a (10/10 vs. 4/10) and Exp. 1c (4/4 344 and 4/10), which they did not. 
Experiment 2 350
Every day uncertainty also pertains to what others will do, especially for highly 351 sociable species. In Experiment 2, we aimed to further investigate the boundaries of 352 long-tailed macaques statistical reasoning abilities, by exploring whether they can 353 also extract statistical information from and make predictions about more complex 354 scenarios involving social agents performing an action. In this experiment, rewarding 355 events were caused by two humans trying to open a box containing grapes. If they 356 succeeded in doing so, they would grab a grape and give it to the monkey, if they did 357 not succeed, they would stop trying and the monkey would receive no reward. 358 twelve sessions. Both conditions only differed in terms of the rewarding patterns 360 associated with both agents. We started by running Exp. 2a and decided to test a 361 rewarding pattern similar to Exp. 1c and 1d, but with more presentations in the 362 sampling phase (favourable agent: succeeded to open the box 6 times out of 6 363 attempts; unfavourable agents succeeded 6 times out of 12 attempts). We then run 364
Exp. 2b with similar rewarding patterns as in Exp. 1c and 1d, to have a better 365 comparison (favourable agent: succeeded 4 times out of 4 attempts; unfavourable 366 agents succeeded 4 times out of 10 attempts). 367
Methods 368
Subjects 369 12 subjects (female N = 6) participated and completed Exp. 2a and 15 subjects 370 participated in Exp. 2b but only 14 (female N = 8) completed it (see Table 1 for more 371 details). Monkeys were part of the same social group and the same housing 372 conditions as in Experiment 1. 373
Ethics 374
See Experiment 1. 375
Study procedure 376
Each of the 12 sessions unfolded as follow: a white box (10 cm X 10 cm X 10 cm) 377 containing grapes and closed by a sliding lid was set in the middle of the table. 378
Behind the table stood two humans. Following the instructions of the experimenter, 379 one human started the session by moving her closed fist towards the hole in the 380
Plexiglas behind which she stood, and waited for the monkey to touch it. Once the 381 monkey touched her, she tried to open the white box with the help of a little L-shaped 382 tool (Allen key). If she succeeded (successful trials were communicated by the 383 experimenter), she would grab a grape from within the box and hand it to the monkey 384 as reward. If she did not succeed, she would try a bit longer and then stop, so as to 385 keep successful and unsuccessful trials of equal length. This was repeated a certain 386 number of times with twenty seconds intervals between the moment the monkey 387 touched the fist and the next presentation, after what the second person started the 388 same procedure (sampling phase). Thirty seconds after the completion of the 389 sampling phase, on the signal of the experimenter, both humans moved their fists 390 simultaneously to their corresponding hole in the Plexiglas, and waited for the 391 monkey to touch one of them (test trial, see Fig.2 ). All non-rewarded trials were 392 pseudo randomly distributed among all presentations. All sessions were separated 393 by a day or more. In both conditions, the side on which agent A stood was 394 counterbalanced across sessions. In each condition, the person who started the 395 session was counterbalanced across sessions, and the identity of agent A was 396 counterbalanced between subjects. The two social agents were changed between 397
conditions. 398
Coding and analysis 399 assessments, as agreement was perfect in Experiment 1. 
Results and discussion 409
On average, subjects selected the favourable agent in 7.7 trials in Exp. 2a (63.9%; 410 SD = 1.50 trials) and in 6.93 trials in Exp. 2b (57.8%; SD = 1.83 trials), significantly 411 more than expected by chance (Exp. 2a: t(11) = 3.86, p < .01, d = 1.11; Exp. 2b: 412 t(13) = 1.83, p = .05, d = 0.51, see Fig. 5 , for individual performances, see Table S1  413 for the supplementary material). There was however no significant correlation 414 between group performance and trial number (Exp. 2a: r= 0.024, p= 0.94; Exp. 2b: r 415 group extracted statistical information from more complex events involving social 417 agents to estimate the probability with which interacting with each person would yield 418 a reward, and adjusted their decisions accordingly. However, their lack of learning in 419
Exp. 2b, compared to Exp. 1d, indicates that despite the same rewarding frequencies 420 associated with both options, Experiment 2 was harder than Experiment 1. There are 421 several possible reasons explaining this pattern of behaviour. First, because of the 422 increased complexity of the task (two social agents manipulating tools to open a box 423 containing rewards), monkeys might have needed more than 12 sessions to be 424 confident about which factor lead to more probable rewards and were still 425 considering different possibilities. Second, it could be that monkeys did not recognize 426 that the two humans were the same individuals across all sessions and therefore did 427 only estimate their predictive power within but not between sessions. This, however, 428
is not very likely, at least in Exp. 2a, because the monkeys knew the two humans 429 well. Third, it might be that long-tailed macaques do not represent humans ' 430 propensity to open a box as being stable over time, and therefore treated each 431 session separately. Fourth, because of the complexity of the task, it is possible that 432 this time, monkeys only considered the predictive power of the side of presentation of 433 both humans, and not of the humans themselves. As the side was only predictive 434 within but not between sessions (i.e., the same human would stand on the same side 435 of the table during the sampling phase and the test trial, but the side was 436 counterbalanced across sessions), it could be a reason why their performance was 437 above chance level but did not increase over sessions. 438
Experiment 3 439
In Experiment 3, we aimed to further investigate the boundaries of the long-tailed 440 macaques' statistical reasoning abilities in repeated types of events scenarios. More 441 particularly, we aimed to explore whether long-tailed macaques can also extract 442 statistical information from complex scenarios involving both social and non-social 443 factors, and in which the rewarding frequencies are either conditional on the social or 444 on the non-social factors. In real life scenarios, when an agent is good at performing 445 a task, it could be due to intrinsic characteristics of that agent or of the task. By 446 monitoring covariation patterns between different agents and different tasks, one can 447 disentangle between the different possibilities (see Gweon & Schulz, 2011 , for an 448 example with human infants). In Experiment 3, rewarding events were also caused 449 by two humans, but this time both humans would try to open two different boxes. 450
Therefore, the different humans and the different boxes could potentially account for 451 the variation in the rewarding patterns. Experiment 3 consisted of two conditions. In 452
Exp. 3a, one human was more likely to open both boxes (she would succeed 5 times 453 out of 5 with both boxes -10 times out of 10 times in total -compared to the other 454 human who would succeed 2 times out of 5 with both boxes -in total 4 times out of 455 10), but both boxes would be opened at the same rates. In Exp. 3b, one box was 456 more likely to be opened by both humans (one box would be opened by both humans 457 5 times out of 5 -10 times out of 10 in total -whereas the other would only be 458 opened 2 times out of five by both humans -in total 4 times out of 10, see Table 1) , 459 but both humans would open boxes at similar rates. In the test trial, one box was put 460 in front of one human, and the other box in front of the other human. If long-tailed 461 macaques were able to pay attention to the covariation pattern between the 462 rewarding frequencies and the different factors (humans or boxes), we predicted that 463 in Exp. 3a, they would base their decisions on the human, irrespective of the box 464 placed in front of her, whereas in Exp. 3b, they would base their decisions on the 465 box, irrespective of the human standing behind it. This experiment additionally 466 allowed us to test more directly whether monkeys' lack of learning in Experiment 2 467 was due to their inability to consider social agents as predictive factors across 468 sessions. If this was the case, their performance should increase across sessions in 469 not in Exp. 3a, in which the social agents were predictive. 471
Methods 472
Subjects 473
Twelve and eleven subjects participated in and completed Exp. 3a and Exp. 3b 474 respectively. Monkeys were part of the same social group and the same housing 475 conditions as in Experiment 1. 476
Ethics 477
See Experiment 1 478
Study procedure 479
The procedure was the same as in Experiment Each box therefore appeared on both sides of the table during the sampling phase. 484
In the test phase, both humans kept their places, and one box was put in front of 485 each human. Sessions were separated by a day or more. In both conditions, the side 486 on which the boxes were placed during the test trial was counterbalanced between 487 sessions. In both conditions, the side on which person A stood was counterbalanced 488 across sessions. In each condition, the person who started the session was 489 counterbalanced across sessions, and the identity of the favourable agent was 490 counterbalanced between subjects. Trials in which the first box was first opened by 491 both persons, and trials in which one person first tried to open both boxes, were 492 counterbalanced between sessions. All non-rewarded trials were pseudo randomly 493 distributed among all presentations. The social agents were changed between 494 conditions. Half of the subjects started with Exp. 3a and then Exp. 3b, and the other 495 half started with Exp. 3b first. Approximately 20 days elapsed between both 496 conditions. 497
Coding and analyses 498
See Experiment 1. In this experiment, we refrained from further observer reliability 499 assessments, as agreement was perfect in Experiment 1. choosing the favourable option, in both conditions. "Humans" stands for the condition 503
in which the rewarding patterns covaried with the social agents (Exp. 3a) and "Boxes" 504 stands for the condition in which the rewarding patterns covaried with the boxes. 505
Filled circles represent the group means, and the black back bars represent the 506 standard errors. The empty circles represent individual performances. b) shows the 507 correlation between group performance and trial number for each condition. The dark 508
lines are regression lines and the light lines show the closest fit to the data points. 509 3a, and box A in 7.36 trials (61.4%; SD = 1.00 trials) in Exp. 3b, significantly more 513 than expected by chance (Exp. 3a: t(10) = 2.00, p = .04, d = 0.58; Exp. 2b: t(10) = 514 3.32, p < .01, d = 1.00, see Fig. 6 , for individual performances, see Table S1 for the 515 supplementary material). In addition, in both conditions, there was no significant 516 correlation between group performance and trial number (Exp. 3a: r = 0.48, p = 0.12; 517
Exp. 3b: r = 0.13, p = 0.68, see Fig. 6 ). These findings suggest that long-tailed 518 macaques as a group relied on more complex covariation structures, to estimate 519 which factor would more likely lead to a reward. Furthermore, these findings suggest 520 that the difference in monkeys' performance between Experiment 1 and 2 was not 521 due to their inability to rely on humans as predictors, as their performance was also 522 lower in Exp. 3b, and did not increase across trials. Also, it seems unlikely that their 523 above chance performance, but lack of learning across sessions in Experiment 2 and 524 3 was due to their reliance on the side of presentation as predictor rather than on the 525 humans or the boxes. If this was the case, long-tailed macaques should have 526 performed at chance level in Exp. 3b, because the side on which the different boxes 527 were presented in the sampling phase was not predictive of their side of presentation 528 in the test phase. Their overall lower performance and lack of learning in Experiment 529 2 and 3, compared to Experiment 1, might therefore have been due to the increased 530 complexity of the tasks. As there were more potential factors to consider, monkeys 531 might simply have needed more time to learn with confidence which factor was 532 predicting a more likely reward across sessions. Alternatively, monkeys could also 533 have had trouble to represent different abilities to open boxes, and different 534
propensities of boxes to be opened as enduring characteristics of social agents and 535 boxes and might not have extended their learning from one session to the other. 536 provided in sampling phase is that they based their decisions on the outcomes of the 539 previous trials and engaged in a Win-Stay, Loose-Switch strategy (hereafter WS-LS 540 strategy). To disentangle between both possibilities, we ran for each condition of 541 each experiment a post-hoc Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM). We first 542 coded, for each trial, whether individuals stayed with their choice in the next trial, or 543 switched (Strategy variable). This resulted in 11 trials per individuals, as this 544 information was not available for trial 12 (there was no trial 13). We also coded for Results indicate that Correct choice was predictive of their stay/switch behaviour for 553 each condition of each experiment, except Exp. 2b, in which Reward was predictive 554 (see Table S4 from the supplementary material). These results suggest that in 555 general, long-tailed macaques relied on the statistical information extracted from the 556 sampling phase, but that in some specific cases, they might have switched to a WS-557 LS strategy. 558
General discussion 559
Overall, our results suggest that long-tailed macaques extract statistical 560 contingencies between patterns of rewards and different factors from repeated types 561 of events, to assess which factors predict more probable rewards and adjust their 562 decisions accordingly. Long-tailed macaques' good performance in all conditions of 563 Experiment 1 indicates that they did not rely on quantity heuristics to direct their 564 choices, but rather used relative frequencies of rewards to estimate probabilities of 565 future events. Our results also suggest that the condition -and therefore different 566 contrasts of rewarding frequencies and different quantities of information -had an 567 effect on monkeys' probability to choose the favourable object. The monkeys' 568 confidence in choosing the favourable option seemed to increase with larger sample 569
sizes. 570
The long-tailed macaques also seemed to rely on statistical information to 571 make predictions in more complex scenarios involving several potential factors of 572 different natures (social vs. non-social). However, the complexity or the nature of the 573 factors seemed to affect monkeys' ability to update their inferences with new 574 information. In fact, the long-tailed macaques' propensity to select the favourable 575 option was lower in Experiments 2 and 3 than in Experiment 1, and did not increase 576 across sessions. One reason for this could be that, with an increasing number of 577 factors to consider, and with longer actions, monkeys had to test more hypotheses 578 regarding which factors predicted more likely rewards, which in turn required more 579 information and thus more sessions. Another reason could be that the nature of the 580 potential factors prevented monkeys from extracting the relevant information, either 581 because they do not possess the required mental representations, or because they 582 did not realize that these factors were the same across sessions, and were therefore 583 predictive within and between sessions. This might in turn have increased their 584 propensity to rely on alternative strategies, such as a Win-Stay, Loose-Switch 585 strategy based on previous outcomes. Our results suggest that this was the case for 586 one of the conditions of Experiment 2, in which the factors predicting the rewards 587 were two humans. 588
These findings suggest that not only apes, but also monkeys do engage in 589 statistical reasoning. However, there seems to be differences between the reasoning 590 ability required to solve tasks in which statistical information is extracted from 591 repeated types of events, and tasks akin to games of chance. In fact, long-tailed 592 macaques from the same population that we tested in the current study previously 593 failed in tasks in which they had to make predictions from populations of objects to 594 randomly drawn samples (see Placì et al. 2018 ). These differences could be due to 595 the way statistical information had to be acquired in both types of tasks. In the current 596 study, statistical information had to be extracted from the temporal contingencies 597 between experienced events. In the previous study, assumptions about the sampling 598 process had first to be extracted from visual cues provided by the experimenter (e.g., 599
looking away from the buckets or closing her eyes and drawing an item out of each 600 bucket). Once the sampling process was assumed to be random, the proportions of 601 the different objects present in the buckets had to be estimated to compute the 602 probability that an object of each type would be sampled. Monkeys did therefore not 603 directly experience the probabilistic contingencies necessary to make rational 604
decisions. 605
Interestingly, differences in statistical reasoning abilities due to different kinds 606 of tasks have also been highlighted in human adults. Human adults are better at 607 tasks in which they can extract statistical information from experienced events than in 608 tasks in which they have to extract information from symbolic descriptions (see for 609 example, Hertwig, Hogarth & Lejarraga, 2018; Rehder & Waldmann 2017). It seems 610 that experiencing probabilistic contingencies improves decision making under 611
uncertainty. 612
This difference in performance depending on the type of task could point to 613 different reasoning mechanisms, one for solving probabilistic problems without 614 experience and relying on information extracted in the present, and one for solving 615 succession of events. Findings from a study done with 3-and 5-years-old children 617 suggest that two cognitive mechanisms are indeed at play, as children's reasoning 618 about experienced events seemed to work independently from their reasoning about 619 probabilities of single-events (Téglás et al., 2007) . It would be interesting to 620 investigate statistical reasoning with repeated events in more species, to investigate 621 the evolutionary origins of this ability. Such ability has recently been investigated in a 622 species of birds (Roberts et al 2018) with similar results to ours. 623
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